Friday, May 31, 2019

Paradise Lost by John Milton :: sin, death

     The family reunion that takes place with Satan, Sin and demolition foreshadows the fall of man. Sin and Death are personifications against broken heavenly laws narcissism, incest and lust. Satan becomes enamored by his own creation because he sees himself in her image "...who full oft/Thyself in me thy double-dyed(a) image" ll. 763-764. However, he goes on to commit two other sins as he lusts and goes off "in secret" with his own daughter. Sin, in turn, gives birth so painfully, she describes it as such, "breaking violent way/Tore through my entrails". The sins within the family are further compounded by Death who rapes his mother. Sin in turn give birth to howling dogs that forever cause her pain.     Miltons allegorical representation here works with the rest of the poem because it is the most poignant representative of Miltons misogynic attitude. His attitude towards women is sprawled though out the poem as de picts Eve, thus there is a parallel between Sin and Eve. Milton represents both of them as inherently evil. Aside from the fact that Sin was created from Satans twisted thoughts, she commits no offenses against Gods laws. For example, Sin gave in to her fathers sexual advances and ran in fear from her sons. One can arguably say that she, as Satans daughter acted "appropriately" submissive to her fathers command. To add, she feared the unspiritualness of her sons advances. Milton gives ample indication of Sins unwillingness to have sex with her son when he says, " I fled, but he moveand swifter far,/Me overtook his mother all dismayed,/And in embraces forcible and foul" (ll. 790-793). Yet, the punishments for these vile sexual encounters are suffered only by Sin. The latter advance being so vile that she suffers it incessantly as she experiences the painful births of the dogs over and over again, "hourly conceived/And hourly born" (ll796-797). This gross ima gery foreshadows what Eve will soon experience later on the fall of Eden.It is also important to note that Sin carries the entire burden of her familys vice within her womb as would Eve and all of her daughters. According to Milton, the airplane pilot sin of procreating via sex began in the non-mortal world, and the woman suffers it by painful births.

Thursday, May 30, 2019

germany Essay -- essays research papers

Germany is a country located in Central Europe, which is officially named the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland). On October 3, 1990 Germanys East and West became one nation nether unification, the capital city now being Berlin. Germany has the second largest population in Europe with eighty two million, next to that of the Soviet Union. Germanys land borders are with Denmark on the north, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemborg, and France on the west, Switzerland and Austria on the south, and Czechoslovakia and Poland on the east and southeast. The present leader of Germany is Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who was elected October 27, 1998 and is now serving his second term in office. Germanys currency is the "Euro," which is a common currency among twelve other European nations. Germanys flag consists of three equal horozontal strips of black, red, and gold. The flag symbolizes German unity. Germans believe the colors in the flag view a meaning, black re presents "out of the darkness," red represents "through blood", and finally gold which represents "into sunshine." The flag was adopted in 1990 when East and West Germany unified.     Major German cities include Berlin (3.4 million), Hamburg (1.7 million), Mnchen (Munich)(1.2 million), Kln(Cologne)(964,000), Frankfurt, Essen, Dsseldorf, Stuttgart, Dresden, Hanover, and Bonh. All these major cities have a wonderful cultural history consisting of over two-hundred theatres and opera houses, one-hundred large orchestras, and more than than two-thousand museums amongst them. Most of the cultural ongoings in Germany are financed by the state and local governments.     Music plays an important role in Germanys culture with such well-known artists as Johann Sebastian Bach, Georger Frederick Handel, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Ludwig von Beethoven, Felix Mendelssohn, and Franz Schubert. Germans take great pride in the long list of great people who made music famous both in Germany and around the world. German people also enjoy sports and recreation the most popular of which is soccer called Fussball. A favorite winter sport is skiing.      Germany consists of four major land regions the Yankee Plains, the Central Highlands, the Alpine Foothills, and the Rhine River Valley. Ma... ...school (Gymnasium). Students who finish secondary school usually become apprentices for three years, so they can learn a trade. There are one-hundred 90 five universities, and other institutions of higher learning in Germany, as well as, more than twenty five art and music academies. The 2003 literary rate in Germany was 99% therefore, proving a highly successful preceptal system.     Germany has an extensive system of social security and welfare. It covers old-age pensions, unemployment (2005 unemployment rate is 4.8 million), sickness benefits, allowences for injury, rent, and child car e, as well as, grants for education and job training. About one-third of Germanys gross national product is spent on social security.     Germany also suffers from a housing shortage, and rents remain high.Most people personify in apartnments, while few people own homes, since land is very expensive.     Germany is a strong force in Europe, which has many good cultural, educational, and social ideas. The coupled States and Germany have maintained a good relationship over the years, and hopefully will continue to do so.

Wednesday, May 29, 2019

Dance :: essays research papers

George Balanchine was born in St. Petersburg on Jan 22, 1904, into a very musical family and began studying the piano at age 5. He had a upright education in acting and dance training, beginning at age 9, from the Imperial Theater School in St. Petersburg. It was originally thought that young Georgi would change state one of the Tsars cadets, so it was with the thought that if things didnt work out at the ballet school he could always join the army. In fact, in his first course of study he was not at all thrilled by what he was learning. He only got to perform once in the Maryinsky Theater in such spectacles as The Sleeping Beauty that Balanchine became enamored of the theater.Balanchine was raised on the dance traditions of the classical Russian ballet established by Petipa. In kindle of having all the best teachers and dancers in the world at the time Balanchine states that "Contrary to popular belief, ballet was not taken very seriously by the Russian public. It was an e ntertainment almost exclusively for the aristocracy, among whom there were perhaps only a few gentlemen who were not primarily interested in what the ballerinas were doing after the performance" (balletmet.com). This changed with the revolution. concert dance was banned for a period until the Minister of Education, Lunacharsky, a balletomane, persuaded the authorities to gradually reinstate ballet.Sometime between 1919 and 1921, while continuing to dance, Balanchine joined the Petrograd Conservatory of Music. at that place he studied piano and music theory, including composition, harmony, and counterpoint, for three years, and he began to compose music. He became a skilled conductor and pianist and often played for graduating bookman performances at the Imperial Russian Ballet School.He graduated from the Imperial Theater School with honors in 1921 at age 17 and joined the army corps de ballet of the Maryinsky, by then renamed the State Theater of Opera and Ballet, and now the Kirov Ballet. Balanchine began to choreograph while still in his teens, creating his first work around 1920 or possibly earlier. It was called La Nuit, for himself and a female student, to the music of Anton Rubinstein. Another of his early duets, Enigma, danced in bare feet, was performed once at a benefit on the do of the State Theater, as well as for some years thereafter, in both Petrograd and in the West. In 1923 he was able to form a lower-ranking troupe, the Young Ballet, for which he composed several works in an experimental vein, but the authorities disapproved, and the performers were threatened with dismissal if they continued to participate.

Cival Rights Act 1964 :: essays research papers fc

When the Government Stood Up For Civil Rights "All my life Ive been sick and deteriorate, and now Im just sick and tired of being sick and tired. No one can honestly say Negroes are satisfied. Weve only been patient, but how much more patience can we confirm?" Mrs. Hamer said these words in 1964, a month and a day before the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson. She speaks for the mood of a race, a race that for centuries has built the nation of the States, literally, with blood, sweat, and passive acceptance. She speaks for black Americans who have been second class citizens in their own phratry too long. She speaks for the race that would be patient no longer that would be accepting no more. Mrs. Hamer speaks for the African Americans who stood up in the 1950s and refused to sit down. They were the people who direct the greatest endeavour in modern American history - the civil rights military campaign. It was a mov ement that would be more than a fragment of history, it was a movement that would become a measure of our lives (Shipler 12). When Martin Luther King Jr. stirred up the conscience of a nation, he gave voice to a long lain dormant pietism in America, a voice that the government could no longer ignore. The government finally answered on July 2nd with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is historically significant because it stands as a defining piece of civil rights legislation, being the first time the national government had declared equality for blacks. The civil rights movement was a campaign led by a number of organizations, supported by many individuals, to end discrimination and achieve equality for American Blacks (Mooney 776). The brain of the struggle came during the 1950s and the 1960s when the feeling of oppression intensified and efforts increased to gain access to public accommodations, increased voting rights, and better educational opportunitie s (Mooney). Civil rights in America began with the adoption of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution, which ended slavery and freed blacks in theory. The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875 were passed, guaranteeing the rights of blacks in the courts and access to public accommodation. These were, however, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, who decided that the 14th did not protect blacks from violation of civil rights, by individuals.

Tuesday, May 28, 2019

Russian Revolution and Orwell Essay -- Animal Farm George Orwell Novel

Russian Revolution and Orwell Animal Farm and the Russian Revolution prepare galore(postnominal) similarities and ideas. The characters, settings, and the plots are the same. In addition Animal Farm is a satire and allegory of the Russian Revolution, George Orwell meant for it to be that way. My essay will cover the comparison amidst Animal Farm and the Russian Revolution. Also it will explain why this novel is a satire and allegory to the Revolution. First of all the characters of the farm have a special role in Russian Revolution. The farm itself represents Russia, with its poor conditions and non-responsible leaders. short sleep, the evil pig who plays Joseph Stalin in real life. Snowball, the leader who gives aid and information to Napoleon and plays the character Lenin on the Russian revolution...

Russian Revolution and Orwell Essay -- Animal Farm George Orwell Novel

Russian Revolution and Orwell Animal Farm and the Russian Revolution cook galore(postnominal) similarities and ideas. The characters, settings, and the plots are the same. In addition Animal Farm is a satire and allegory of the Russian Revolution, George Orwell meant for it to be that way. My essay will cover the comparison amongst Animal Farm and the Russian Revolution. Also it will explain why this novel is a satire and allegory to the Revolution. First of all the characters of the farm have a special role in Russian Revolution. The farm itself represents Russia, with its poor conditions and non-responsible leaders. snooze, the evil pig who plays Joseph Stalin in real life. Snowball, the leader who gives aid and information to Napoleon and plays the character Lenin on the Russian revolution...

Monday, May 27, 2019

Islamization of the Philippines Essay

Contrary to the methods of Spanish conquistadors who handled colonization at swordpoint, the introduction of Islam to pre-colonial Philippines and to the rest of Southeast Asia was generally achieved with minimal bloodshed. By marrying into the rich and ruling class, Muslim traders, teachers and missionaries facilitated the splay of Islam as they travelled to Java, Sumatra, Jahore, Malacca, Borneo and other nearby islands to conduct their mission. By the 13th century, most of the lands of Southeast Asia were Islamized, and pretty soon the southern part of the Philippines followed this trend during the fourteenth century.But of course, this phenomenon could have not been possible without notable Muslim people who spearheaded the spread of Islam. Based on the tarsila or the genealogies, the first-year one who introduced Islam in the coarse was Tuan Mashaika, the supposed son of Jamiyun Kalisa and his wife, Indira Suga, who were both sent to Sulu by Alexander the Great (Mongcal). Tua n Masaika wed the daughter of Raja Sipad of Patikol in Buansa, present-day Jolo (Scribd.com). He was followed by Karim-ul Makhdum, or simply Mukdum, a noted Arabian scholar who introduced Islam in Malacca in the middle of 14th century and continued his travel to the east. He accordingly reached Simunol, Sulu after passing through Sambuwangan (Zamboanga) and Basilan in 1380 (Mongcal). He built the first mosque in Sulu, and he continued to preach Islam until the fourth dimension of his death. Around 1390, Raja Baginda, a minor prince from Menangkabaw, Sumatra arrived with soldiers and conquered Sulu.Afterwards, in 1450, they were followed by a Jahore-0-born Arab explorer-1 and religious scholar-2 named Sayyid Abu Bakr Abirin, or simply Abu Bakr (Sultanate of Sulu- Wikipedia). Upon coming to Sulu, Abu Bakr married Paramisuli, the local dayang-dayang or princess, and daughter of his predecessor, Raja Baginda. Then, he founded the first-ever sultanate of Sulu with him as the sultan, a nd thus he assumed the title Paduka Mahasari Maulana al Sultan Sharif ul-Hshim. But it was Shariff Muhammad Kabungsuwan Ibrahim, son of a royal-blooded Arab from Hadramaut (Scribd.com), who stretched the borders of Islamization beyond Sulu, and into the entirety of Mindanao. In 1475 he and his soldiers invaded the natives of present-day Cotabato and married the princess Putri Tonina. He then founded the sultanate of Mindanao with him as the head.It wasnt just the natives in Mindanao who had been affected by the spread of Islam. Malay traders from Borneo facilitated the spread of Islam to some of the provinces of Luzon, namely Batangas, Mindoro and Pampanga. By the time the Spaniards arrived during the 16th century, they were surprised to discover that natives from certain parts of Luzon, including pre-colonial Manila and Tondo, practiced Islam. It is common knowledge, however, that technically and generally, the Spaniards had been more successful in propagating their religion all th roughout the Philippines, thus confining and paralyzing the spread and influence of Islam. Today, the Philippines is one of the most predominant Roman Catholic nations in the world, second to East Timor in Southeast Asia. simply about 5% of todays Philippine population practices Islam.The Roots of Education in the PhilippinesIt is common for Filipinos to place a high regard on education not only as a predestined obligation to their children, but also as an important means to a higher genial and economical status. According to the National Statistics Office or NSO, as of May 2012, 58 million out of the estimated 67 million Filipinos aged 10 to 64 years old are functionally literate, meaning they can read, write, compute, and comprehend (Mercene). Most Filipinos who are functionally literate are those whose who have at least(prenominal) finished high school.In pre-colonial Philippines, however, education in hunting-gathering communities or Primitive Communal societies was informal, unstructured, and devoid of methods (DepEd). It is less focused on academics characterized by the 3Rs which are reading, composing and arithmetic, and more compliant to vocational activities. The learners were taught by their parents or in the houses of tribal educators such as the babaylan or the katalonan, who are believed to possess wisdom and knowledge on spirituality with respect to their beliefs and traditions (Sribd). An ancient Southeast Asian writing system, called the Baybayin, was used as a teaching medium.Baybayin, from the Tagalog term baybay which means to spell is a process of the Brahmic family-3 and is recorded as being in use in the 16th century, up until the late 19th century (Baybayin Wikipedia). It is not to be confused with Alibata, which is Arabic in origin. Ancient writing tools consist of leaves, palm fronds, tree bark, fruit rinds, daggers as panulat and materials made from bamboo. Upon the arrival of the Spaniards, these native communities are already practically and technically literate using the Baybayin.There had been several major changes to the type of education in the Philippines during the Spanish period, as their teachings were centralized on the ideology of Catholicism. The tribal tutors were replaced with Spanish missionaries, and the province for providing primary education to indigenous populations was left to religious orders, headed by parish friars. The concepts of church and school were merged. This elitist, religious-oriented and exceedingly patriarchal type of education continued until it was part liberalized through the enactment of the Educational Decree of 1863 which provided for the establishment of at least one primary school for boys and girls in each town under the responsibility of the municipal government (DepEd). The first book printed in the Philippines, a version of Doctrina Christiana or Christian Doctrine in the Chinese language, was printed in 1590, to be followed by versions in Tagalog and Span ish in 1593.There were four major groups of Spanish missionaries who launch Christian schools in the Philippines, most of these institutions still teaching at present. The Augustinians established a school in Cebu in 1565, and then the Franciscans took charge of educating the natives in 1577. The Jesuits followed in 1581, with the youth as their focus. They also founded the Unibersidad de San Ignacio, which was later incorporated into the University of Santo Tomas, and also the Colegio de San Jos in 1601 that took over the management in what became Escuela Municipal, now Ateneo de Manila University (Education in the Philippines- Wikipedia). The last group of missionaries were the Dominicans, who established a school on their first mission in Bataan in 1587, and later founded Colegio de San Juan de Letran in 1620. In general, however, education during the Spanish period was inadequate, suppressed, and controlled (DepEd).A free and adequate secularized public school system only came with the first decade of the American rule, with respect to recommendations of the Schurman relegating, or the First Philippine Commission a tail fin-person group headed by Dr. Jacob Schurman-4, president of Cornell University-5, to investigate conditions in the islands and make recommendations (Schurman Commission Wikipedia). The Taft Commission or the Second Philippine Commission established by President William Mckinley came later in 1900. This commission, headed by William Howard Taft-6, was granted legislative as easy as limited executive powers (Taft Commission Wikipedia), and thus it focused on training the people for the duties of citizenship and avocation. The spread of public schools throughout the Philippines came afterwards in 1901, when the Thomasites, the five hundred pioneer teachers sent by the U.S. government to the Philippines due to shortage of teachers, arrived and established barangay schools.Works Cited ListMongcal, MAJ SAMUEL T . Sulu Our Ancestral Domain . The Philippine Marine corps Official Web Site. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Oct. 2012. .Sultanate of Sulu Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Oct. 2012. .The Spread of Islam in the Philippines. Scribd. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Oct. 2012. .REPORT IN HUM 10Javier, Jess G.Hum10 B1-0 http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johore-1 http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_people-2 http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_scholar-3 http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahmic_family-4 http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_Gould_Schurman-5 http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornell_University-6 http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Howard_Taft

Sunday, May 26, 2019

Contraceptives in School Essay

During the past decade, in that location excite been stark generational differences in terms of moral and social norms. In order to accommodate for these changes, society has had to make difficult closes regarding the protection of todays y breakh. One of the biggest contr everyplacesies that have been ongoing deals with the gray ara regarding the roles of educators and cites. School systems today argon distributing guards and contraceptives to students as young as 11 years old with the intention of preventing their students from suffering from the negative side effects of sex.From an ducators perspective, the scattering of condoms has become a indispensableness due to the overwhelming lack of morals instilled in the youth at the fault of their p arents. They also argue that it encour grows safety and that it is completely foolish to assume that sobriety is always practiced. On the contrary, conservatives will argue that condoms promote sex and their distribution will show m inors that sex at a young age is socially acceptable. Conservatives opinions are naive because they blatantly condone the fact that standards and practices have changed dramatically over time.The rising issue of under aged sex has make the distribution of condoms a necessity in order to combat the negative ramifications of the decisions made by todays un civilized youth. A misconception that is widely believed is that passing out condoms in schooltimes will influence or pressure teens to have sex. According to Dr. Kevin J. Minch, if young people believe they will be safe when using a condom they are much little likely to be deterred from engaging in dangerous and immoral behavior (Minch).The conservatives believe that with the introduction of condoms at an early age, this would send to the unnecessary exposure of the youth to a concept hat should only be tackled by legal adults. It allows them to stray into the obscure world they are non yet ready for. Widespread condom distribu tion will establish sexual activity as the norm among young teens, creating peer pressure to put down in sex. The added temptation to engage in sexual activity is protected will result in more women having sex at a jr. age, perhaps furthering their exploitation. Minch) Sex is a topic that should be addressed at the discretion of each parent and the fact is that educators are slowly taking over the responsibilities of the parent. The opposition would argue that parents of every ethnicity and background have spent years of their life attempting to instill solid morals and values to their children. It is understandable how a parent would feel for a high school teacher to pass out condoms to students at such a young age. Education systems are making the decision on what they think is best for the child rather than having the parents deciding the verdict on this issue.It is said that juvenilers who have a good relationship with their parents are less likely to experience a pregnancy an d the harsh consequences from unprotected sex. Good communication between parents nd children helps ensure that children make the right decisions when it comes to their sexual activity. However, as seen by the statistics, the amount of parental involvement in the lives of teens today is limited. Educators are simply picking up the slack since some parents do non educate their children on the simple right and wrongs like previous generations were taught.In addition to educators programs that educate our youth and that tax relenters should not fund these programs. Is it really the responsibility of hardworking taxpayers to pay for the use of protection for irresponsible teens? I certainly do not think so (Cook). Educators do not need to sanction the idea of a sexually active lifestyle however they should hearten all young teenagers to make Judicious decisions when it comes to being sexually active. In this case, schools provide their sex-education classes and many cull it stayed Jus t that, that it is not fit to provide a basket of condoms upon the exiting of a classroom.What the conservatives fail to do is look at the logical perspective and to take into figure the statistics and reality of todays youth. What needs to be widely noticed is that the unify States has the highest rates of teen pregnancy and births. It is fact that that the teen pregnancies in our nation cost the United States at least 7 billion dollars each year. For the fiscal year of 2006 the federal government spent over 38 billion dollars to support families that began with a birth from a teenage mother.Nearly eight billion dollars is spent each year to diagnose and treat sexually transmitted diseases. Either the currency paid towards taxes can contribute to pregnancies and their after effects, or the money can be well Prevention is much more important when all the facts are spent on prevention. displayed. Every year, around 750,000 teenagers will get pregnant. As a result, more than two th irds of teenagers who give birth will drop out of school, thus leading to an uneducated and difficult future.Teenage mothers and their children are more likely than others to be placed in the poverty bracket therefore billions of dollars are spent taking care of them. Teen pregnancies are seen as a disadvantage in todays society due to the fact that many children born to teenage mothers tend to have a low birth rate. In addition to this, children born to teenage mothers are said to do poorly in school as they age and are more suceptible to abuse and neglect. The ruth is that the Centers of Disease Control reports nineteen million new STDs each year and approximately one-half of these reports are from our youth.One in four sexually active teenagers become infected with a sexually transmitted disease every year, which includes but is not limited to Chlamydia, Gonorrhea, Genital Warts, and Herpes. (The Alan Guttmacher Institute). Another mind wrenching fact coming from the American Soc ial Health Association is that of nine million new STD cases in the year 2000, ninety percent was accounted for by HIV and HPV (Human Papillomavirus) in ages fifteen to twenty-four years of age. Chesson HW, Blandford JM, Gift TL, Tao G, Irwin KL. According to an educator working out of a New York City public high school, the idea of distributing condoms has her approval. If I could, I would give out condoms in my classroom. I think we should make it as well-fixed as possible for teens to access condoms. This statement could cause an upheaval of opinion, but this teacher is looking out for the welfare of her students. High school students main reduce should be education, goal setting, and discovering their own individuality. These teenagers should live an energetic and active life without worrying about remarital sex.Even though this is true, it has been turn up that over 50% of teenagers have had sexual intercourse before graduating High School. So what is to come of this? Consi dering a high percentage of high school students are in fact having sex, there are outstanding statistics proving many STDs and teenage with the prevention classes and protection. When students are provided with condoms, it at least gives them the opportunity to be responsible with such an irresponsible act. Condoms are proven not to be 100% effective protecting against pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.However they have and will cut the odds by a landslide. Their distribution could have a significant impact on many lives by protecting them from diseases and unforeseen pregnancies that can end a young mothers future. The best defense against STDs and under aged pregnancies is simply knowledge and protection. Frequently, parents are too embarrassed to approach their child about any figure of sexual activity. For this reason students are left uniformed and in harms way. A catastrophe will take place if sex education and protection are taken away from the students today.P arents need to be active and not permit sexual activity and disregard its existence. Often our society does not recognize these situations. unheeding of the parents opinions of moral and religious rights, someone has to protect the youth considering abstinence is not a sure avenue for these children. This is why our education systems have, and need to continue doing so, taken a step forth to protect our nations future.

Saturday, May 25, 2019

Marketing – Colgate Greece

When the brand was introduced in the Grecian Market? Colgate Palmolive (Hellas) was found in 13th February 1962 with import of foreigner capital and as tail the city of Athens. It is fact, however, that from 1950, products as toothpaste Colgate, custard of shaves Palmolive, Soap Palmolive they were imported and distributed in the Greek market by the company OLYMPIA, which continued distributing and traffic in products Colgate-Palmolive also afterwards the foundation of Greek company and the domestic production of these, up to 1974. Line Extension Colgate Sensitive Pro-Relief Colgate Max White Colgate Max Fresh Colgate Time take Colgate Oxygen Colgate issue forth Colgate Total Advanced Fresh Colgate Total Plus discolour Colgate Total Fresh Stripe Colgate Sensitive Colgate Sensitive Whitening Colgate Whitening Colgate herbal tea Colgate Herbal White Colgate Protection Caries Colgate Triple Action Colgate Baking Soda Colgate Anti-Tartar Plus Whiten ing Colgate Blue Minty Gel Colgate Oulodent Regular Colgate Oulodent Colgate Smiles Colgate 2 1 * The overall potential of Colgates Toothpastes is 30% as a value share. The table below draws us analytically the potential of toothpastes in Greek market. Colgate Total Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC 10. 8 9. 9 9. 4 7. 5 produce polish off 8 Actions Unilever Hellas SA - - 3. 6 6. 7 Aim C-Fresh Unilever Hellas SA - 2. 5 5. 1 6. 0 Aim White System Unilever Hellas SA 6. 3 6. 5 6. 4 5. 8 Colgate Whitening Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC 4. 4 4. 0 4. 1 4. 3 Theramed 2-in-1 Henkel Hellas SA 4. 6 4. 7 3. 8 3. Colgate Herbal White Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC 3. 1 3. 1 3. 2 3. 4 Colgate Herbal Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC 3. 4 3. 5 3. 0 3. 2 Colgate Baking Soda Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC 5. 9 5. 0 3. 2 2. 7 Colgate Max Fresh Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC 1. 6 2. 0 2. 4 2. 5 Colgate Time Control Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC 1. 0 2. 0 2. 5 2. 4 Crest Complete Extra White Geroly matos Cosmetics SA - - - 2. 3 Aim Family Unilever Hellas SA 3. 8 3. 5 2. 7 2. 0Colgate Oulodent Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC - - 2. 2. 0 Colgate Smiles Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC 1. 6 1. 8 1. 9 1. 9 Elgydium Whitening capital of South Dakota Fabre Hellas SA 2. 1 1. 6 1. 3 1. 3 Aim White Now Unilever Hellas SA - - 0. 3 1. 1 Colgate Total Advanced Whitening Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC - - 0. 4 0. 8 Colgate Total Fresh Stripe Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC - - - 0. 8 Colgate Total Advanced Clean Colgate-Palmolive Hellas SAIC - - - 0. 7 Theramed Henkel Hellas SA 1. 2 1. 2 0. 7 0. 6 Aquafresh Herbal GlaxoSmithKline SA 0. 1 0. 0. 3 0. 3 A. The target market The Colgate in Greece has created products for all ages and especially for consumers who are concerned active oral health issues. Each product of Colgate is addressed for the different demand of consumers. First of all for people that have problems with their teeth, such as tooth-decay, tooth-plaque, tooth-stone, sensitive gum s and etc. Consumers in this target market usually purchase toothpaste products without caring about the price, as long as they will get the highest superior that Colgate offers to them.Secondly, people who are concerned about their oral hygiene, such as bad breath, and personalized appearance. Consumers in this target market are mostly young people that care about the whitening and the cleanest breath that Colgate offers. Finally, another target market for Colgate is kid. Colgate has several(prenominal) products related to children and as we can see from websites and advertising, children for Colgate are a rather important target market. Colgate tries to offer to parents, toothpaste products with the highest quality that will make their childrens teeth healthy and without harmful issues in the future. B.Marketing Mix Colgate-Palmolive provides to the market reliable and executionive products and it always tries to produce its products with the smaller possible effect in the envi ronment. 1) Product a. development and History Product is anything that can be offered to a market that might satisfy a want or need. Consumers purchase toothpaste products for their desire and satisfaction that they presuppose the product provide. Colgate toothpaste production started in 1873 over the world. Colgate introduced its toothpaste in a tube similar to modern-day toothpaste tubes in the 1890s. Until after 1945, toothpastes contained soap.After that time, other ingredients to make the paste into a smooth paste or emulsion such as sodium lauryl sulphate, a common ingredient in present-day toothpaste replaced soap. In the second half(a) of the twentieth century modern toothpastes were developed to help prevent or treat specific diseases and conditions. b. Design and Quality Toothpastes today typically contain fluoride, coloring, flavoring, sweetener, as well as ingredients that make the toothpaste a smooth paste, foam and stay moist. Individual toothpastes also may conta in special ingredients, such as triclosan in Colgate Total.Toothpaste in tubes is used throughout the world and has been a very successful invention. Colgate provides to the market reliable and effective products and it always tries to produce its products with the smaller possible effect in the environment. Colgate has the highest quality in Market that is why it is first in Greece and over the world in sales. c. Product features Needs to be found from a Colgate package 2) Price Colgate Palmolive prices its products so to be totally competitive to a market. The combination of competitive price as well as excellent quality makes Colgates products to be very high in demand.All prices vary from 2. 5 Euro to 3 Euros for the more composite toothpastes. 3) Distribution A channel of distribution is a group of individuals and organizations that direct the of products from producers to customers. The major role of Distribution channels is to make products available at the right time at the right place in the right quantities. The main Channels for Colgate distribution in market are big department stores as Hondos Center, Carrefour and of course supermarkets, mini markets and alveolar clinics that our dentist suggests Colgate toothpaste. ) Promotion Promotion is one of the most important part of any company, by promoting the product it is published to consumers that the product exist and is available to everyone. in that location are many ways to promote a product as advertising, personal selling, public relations and sales promotion. a. Advertising Colgate primarily used advertisements as its main promotion strategies. Its different products that are designed for different segments are targeted to the audience by highlighting its features. Its common tagline for all products is No1 brand recommended by dentist.Colgate has interpreted up a weird advertising campaign in Bangkok. b. Sales promotion As such no promotion is done at sell level except the recommendation by the shopkeeper. But for rural market Colgate uses VAN (van is a mobile promotion station having facilities for screen show, slide show and mike publicity). c. Public relations PR campaigns were undertaken extensively during the launch of the brand in leading newspapers and magazines, though they were focused more directly on enhancing the witness of the parent company in the eyes of stakeholders like shareholders potential investors that in consumers.

Friday, May 24, 2019

The Perfect Storm and the Titanic analysis

The Perfect Storm and the Titanic are both films that are based on true events they also cop fictional plots and characters. This combination of fact and fiction is the main reason for these accounts becoming films rather than documentaries or other information based programme, as it includes an extra domain of a function of interest into the film which would usually be flat because of the droning historical backgrounds. To increase the tension and sympathy felt by the audience at to each genius climatic ending, the directors both use the fictional plots.They take this fact and fiction as a n advantage, and because of this both plots are based on romance, and the batch involved around the love. In the case of Jack and Rose, their love creates more tension and sympathy at the ending because it is a forbidden love across the household boundaries of rich and poor, alone which seems to be so strong. Bobby and Kristinas love is open and strong. By using these romantic liaisons and including many biographical details through come out of the closet the films, it increases the attainment of the emotions felt by the audience.This is clearly seen in the Perfect Storm when as the ship is beginning to sink and the camera is showing clips of the crew be get-go deck of cards, tater says to the person he is with, this is gonna be hard on my son. This has a direct impact on the audience as earlier in the film he tried to explain to his son that his mother might remarry or get a new partner then he would be his obtain as well the young boy does not like this idea and wants his father to stay.Because of this knowledge from earlier in the film it also answers the audience dark for the families of the dead because in the end the nevertheless reason they were going was because they wanted to bring in money for their families, but the skipper only wanted to go to bring up his weights in the fish market. Due to both these films developing from actual events, it is cruc ial for both of these films settings to be fully detailed to add dialect to the authenticity and credibility of the films.Titanic was an extremely expensive film because of the directors adhering themselves completely to the effect authenticity could have on a film and the way it would make the fictional plot more plausible. The characters were attired in costumes of the period, also the quality of the clothes the actors wore was different to help enforce the class boundaries and the forbidden love betwixt Jack and Rose in the Perfect Storm the ship is strewn with copious amounts of paraphernalia required for deep sea fishing.The rugged disorganisation emits to the audience an breeze of frequent use which takes its toll on the gravy boat and the crew who seem to be continuously draw to the punishment of the sea. To add emphasis to the setting and tinge of hopelessness when the Titanic begins to sink, a short clip is included. It only lasts for a couple of seconds but that is eno ugh for it to have an impact on the audience. It shows the Titanic in all its glowing glory, in the middle of the pitch black Atlantic Ocean, the water is so dark you cant tell where the water is and where the sky is.The music in both films seems to be midsectiond on an orchestra. During facets when there is great suspense, tension and danger the music changes. It becomes thicker and louder, the tempo often increases and there is a contrast betwixt the distance and the pitch of notes and the instruments used. There are long, quite high pitched notes being played by wind and string instruments, with the quickening drum beats and low wind instrument blasts, which are often accompanied by clashing cymbals.This type of music occurs in both films in the Titanic when the ship hits the berg during the Perfect Storm when the helicopter crashes and while the crew attempt an about turn with the boat. During tender moment, the sound changes dramatically. For instance, when Rose and Jack ar e reunited, the music fades into the compassionate newspaper tune, which is played stridently over the top of resonating sound of the two lovers running feet. The effect of this is to emphasise the audiences awareness of the absolute love felt between them.This use of love in each film brings conflicting thoughts into the heads of the audience. For some reason, the audience feels compassionate towards the plight of the characters, almost admiring them for their bravery in the face of danger, but in both films it was clearly the decision of the individuals themselves to undertake the journeys. In the Perfect Storm this idea is again conflicted with the audiences knowledge that most of the people are only going on the voyage to raise funds so they can support their families.In the end the feeling of the audience towards the characters within the film is one of sympathy because the characters are stressing to be the people they are expected to be to live up to standards and to push t he boundaries of anticipation to provide more for their families so that they can live a better life almost to the point of foolhardiness. During the Perfect Storm when the boat reaches the eye of the storm, there are many alterations in the film to effect the mood and feelings of the audience.The music undergoes an almost undetectable metamorphosis, slipping gently between the dramatically thick, heavy use of instruments in the time of danger, easily filtering out most of the noise to leave a lightly textured tone of long high wind and string notes. In the duration of this scene the lighting is also subtly changed. The first shot is from outside the boat, surrounded by tumbling waves and rolling dark clouds. The camera is then focused on the bridge of the Andrea Gale in an interior shot and onto the faces of William and Bobby. The bridge is surrounded by an almost glaring darkness.As they hit the eye of the storm, their faces are slowly illume by a rich honey coloured light. The camera changes to a shot from within the bridge of the boat. The audiences eye is lead, out over the prow of the boat onto a large zone of calm, soothingly lapping water bathed in the rich ambiance of the light from between the parted huge billowing peck clouds. The expressions on the faces of the crewmen change to facades of wonder. But these expressions are quickly transformed to their former selves as the subtle light fades into the darkness.At this point the audiences senses are heightened to the emotions of the characters and the audience feels a sudden heaviness which makes them sympathetic as they can see the process of realization that occurs on the crew as the find they are at the centre of the storm. This use of lighting is also used on the Titanic. The lights on the ship begin to flicker on and off soon after the collision with the iceberg. This is a successful technique as it mingles with the audiences knowledge that they already have of the historical background to the film.This makes the audience nervous as they can see the upper class going around like it was any other day on the ship, as they believe the ship to be unsinkable and do not seduce the immediate danger to their lives. To add to the extent of the effect that the lighting has on the audience, many techniques are used at the same time in familiarity with one another. This is often the case with lighting and camera angles. For instance, in both films to emphasise the tremendous tragedies of each accident, series of short clips are added in the endings.In the Perfect Storm the camera quickly concludes the lives of each character below deck by focusing on them during their last moments, this takes you around the below deck area of the ship as each man seems to be in the place most familiar to them. This cutting to and from each character adds to the authenticity of each characters life as their emotions are plainly seen and have a large impact on the audience. This is also used in the Titanic, as the quartet plays out its final ballad flashing images are shown that correspond to earlier in the film when you see the lower classes being locked below deck.The images include two time-worn people lying together on their bed saying their last goodbyes, the camera is above them to show the water rising around them an Irish adult female telling her children a bedtime story to make them sleep and try to reduce their suffering. This is almost from the perspective of the children to show how this grieves the mother the faces of the ship stewards as they continue to try and keep the lower classes down below where they will inevitably die Dr. Andrews standing alone on the lounge of the upper class contemplating the fate of many that he knew should this situation occur would die, the shot is sweeping and on an angle, drawing through the lounge to the dining room where the floor is completely submerged in water on which most of the furniture is floating. Throughout these clip s the lighting flashes constantly or is completely cut off, surrounding the people in the darkness of their close expiration.

Thursday, May 23, 2019

The United States of America, 1919 – 1941 – Sources Question

(a) (i) President Hoover thought that the causes of the stamp of the 29 werent because of the the States lend capital to Germany, or because of the Dawes Plan, or any other reason that might blame the USA. He thought that all told the other countries had the intermission or were to be blamed because of the Depression of the 29. I think that he thought that way because as he was President from the USA, he was obviously going to back his country and say that his country had been a victim of all the other countries and problems of other parts of the world.(ii) In source B, the historian who wrote that thinks almost completely distinct than President Hoover. You can clearly notice the different opinions, as in source B, it says that the Wall Street Crash was the main cause of the economic Depression of 1929, the historian seems to be sure about it. And in source A, Hoover says that, as I have already mentioned before, the USA had absolutely no fault at all of the Depression. Becau se of these reasons, I can compare both sources and get to the conclusion that the historian of source B did not agree at all with the opinions expressed in source A.(iii) In my opinion, source B is much more reliable and trustworthy, because the historian who wrote that did it in 1984, and it had been a long time since the contendfare finished, and he could analyze all the sources and evidence together. I think that is easier to analyze everything in cold, rather than in hot. I mean that is amend to do it after it had happened, than meanwhile it is happening. Also, one thing that is very important is that the historian was, probably, more objective that the President. Because Hoover had so much pressure that he couldnt say that the USA had the fault of the Depression even though he thought that it really did. So, I think that source B is more utile than the other as evidence of the causes of the Depression.(b) (i) One reason why agriculture did not share in the 1920s boom was be cause of the loss of the European market. During the war America had shipped millions of tons of grain to Europe. Europe ha become the main market for American farm exports. But the First World War had so bankrupted Europe that few Europeans could afford to buy American farm produce any longer. Also, the tariff barriers put up by the Re state-supportedans to protect American industries make Europe poorer still so it could not afford American produce. Another reason is that American farmers were also struggling against competition from the highly efficient Canadian wheat producers. All of this came at a time when the population of the USA was actually falling and there were fewer mouths to feed.(ii) The Wall Street Crash began as a stock market and financial crisis, especially with the crisis of the New York stock exchange. In October 1929 the Wall Street stock market crashed, the American economy collapsed, and the USA entered a long depression which destroyed much of the prosperity of the 1920s. The depression passed from finance to industry and from USA to the whole world. Export of American big(p) came to an end.(iii) The Wall Street Crash lead to a collapse of the US economy because Americans, with their incomes low, couldnt buy foreign goods. People couldnt collect the money they were owed or the money they thought they had in the bank. People could not buy so factories could not sell. Unemployment grew rapidly skills of older people grew rusty and young people had no fortune to learn. This made the people feel discouraged and frustrated, so they turned to new and disturbing political ideas. Optimists, including Hoover, thought that the depression was only a low head teacher in the business cycle, and that Prosperity was just around the corner. But others believed that the depression meant the breakdown of the whole system of capitalism.(iv) Hoover was regarded as a do nothing President. He tried to encourage the US export trade although without much s uccess. Even more damaging to Hoovers reputation, was how little he tried to garter those who were suffering because of the Depression. He believed that social security was not the responsibility of the Government. Hoover appeared to be heartless and indifferent to the suffering of the American people. There could not be a greater contrast to Hoover than his opponent, the Democrat candidate, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who believed strongly in active government trying to improve the lives of ordinary people had plans to spend public money on getting people back to work. As Governor of New York he had already started doing this on his own state. He was not terrified to ask on advice on important issues from a wide range of experts such as factory, union leaders or economists.

Wednesday, May 22, 2019

Ch 9 and 10

How are osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis different? Osteoarthritis usually affects people 60 or senior and is caused by increasing wear and tear at the joint surfaces or from genetic factors affecting collagen formation. On the other hand rheumatoid arthritis is an inflammatory condition. It is caused by the body attacking its own tissues as well as allergies, bacteria, viruses, and other genetic factors. 2) When the triceps brachii muscle contracts, what movements does it produce? When the triceps brachii muscle contracts, it produces extension of the arm. ) Why is the inferior function of the shoulder joint most vulnerable to dislocation? It is most vulnerable to dislocation because it is the most mobile synovial joint. Because of this it is frail and relies only on the skirt ligaments, muscles, and t eat upons for stability. 4) A high school student comes to the emergency room complaining of persistent pain and stiffness in her shoulder joint. In talking with her, you insure that she has been spending many hours trying to improve her pitching skills for her schools softball team.What is likely causing the pain? A shoulder subluxation is most likely causing her pain. This is a partial dislocation of the shoulder and is caused by her overusing her shoulder. This may cause a loose shoulder where her shoulder capsule allow be stretched out as well as the ligaments. This could further lead to chronic shoulder instability. 5) Mary call fors to enter a weight-lifting competition and consults you as to what type of muscle fibers she needs to reveal and how she should go about it. What would you suggest to her?Mary needs to develop her fast muscle fibers. In order to do this, she will need to have frequent, abbreviated and intensive workouts. She also needs to create muscle hypertrophy which will create an enlargement of the stimulated muscle. She can gain this by repeated and thorough stimulation which will create more mitochondria. With repeatedly stimulated muscles she can create near-maximal tension. 6) Describe the basic sequence of events that occurs at the neuromuscular junction and in the muscle cell.The first step is the arrival of an action potential at the synaptic terminal, next is the release of acetylcholine into the synaptic cleft, then Ach binds at the motor end plate and causes sodium-ion to rush into sarcoplasm which is then quickly broken down by AChE. The last step is it returns to initial state which occurs if another action potential arrives at the NMJ. 7) Many visceral smooth muscle cells lack motor neuron innervation. How are their contractions coordinated and controlled? Visceral smooth muscle cells contractions are coordinated by rhythmic cycles of activity that are controlled by pacesetter cells. ) A hypothetical genetic disease causes the body to produce antibodies that compete with acetylcholine for receptors on the motor end plate. Patients with this disease exhibit varying degrees of muscle weakne ss and flaccid paralysis in the affected muscles. If you could administer a drug that inhibits acetylcholinesterase or a drug that blocks acetylcholine, which one would you use to alleviate these symptoms? I would use a drug that inhibits acetylcholinesterase so that acetylcholine is not blocked.If the disease is producing antibodies that compete with acetylcholine than we would not want a drug that blocks it, we would want to inhibit it to activate the muscles. 9) Thirty minutes after Mary has completed a 25-km race, she begins to notice severe muscle rawness and stiffness in her legs. Her urine is dark colored. She wonders whether she may have damaged her muscles during the race. She visits the ER, and the doctor orders several blood tests. What kind of blood tests can help attend whether muscle damage has occurred?The type of blood tests that can help determine whether muscle damage has occurred include Creatine kinase tests, blood enzyme tests, kidney tests, electrolytes tests , red blood cells tests, and a complete blood count test. 10) Describe a motor unit. How many fibers does a muscle unit contain? A motor unit is controlled by a single motor neuron. It contains hundreds of muscle fibers that contract at the same time. All of the fibers will be the same type and the number of muscle fibers will vary within each unit. Usually, the number of muscle fibers innervated by a motor unit is a purpose of a muscles need for polished exercise

Tuesday, May 21, 2019

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures During the Recent Financial Crisis

The Roles of Corporate G everyplacenance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis Berger, Allen N. 1 Imbierowicz, Bjorn2 Rauch, Christian3 July 2012 Abstract This paper trys the fictional characters of somatic trunk in marge failure options during the young pecuniary crisis of 2007-2010. victimization a entropy sample of 249 scorn and 4,021 no inattention US commercial lodges, we investigate the impact of strand possession and counseling structures on the probability of fail.The government issues show that defaults atomic number 18 powerfully enticed by a vernaculars self-possession structure high sh arholdings of outside(a) directors and knob police officers (managers with a psyche officer position, such as the chief operating officer, CFO, etc. ) imply a substanti in in ally cast down probability of snitchure. In contrast, high sh atomic number 18holdings of lower-level management, such as vice presidents, increase default assay signific antly.These flummoxings suggest that high s get winds in the swan induce outside directors and upper-level management to control and get down assay, while greater stakes for lower-level management seem to induce it to take high trys which whitethorn in timetually result in deposit default. Some be variables, such as slap-up, earnings, and non-performing loanwords, overly help predict swear default. However, other potential stability forefingers, such as the management structure of the intrust, indicators of commercialize competition, subprime owe risks, state frugal conditions, and regulatory act upons, do not appear to be decisive factors in predicting lingo default.JEL Codes G21, G28, G32, G34 Keywords Bank Default, Corporate Governance. Bank Regulation 1 University of South Carolina, Moore School of Business, 1705 College Street, Columbia, SC, USA, Phone +1803-576-8440, Wharton Financial Institutions Center, and CentER, Tilburg University, Email emailprotecte d usc. edu 2 Goethe University Frankfurt, Ho phthisis of Finance, Grueneburgplatz 1, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Phone +49-69798-33729, Email emailprotected uni-frankfurt. de 3 Goethe University Frankfurt, House of Finance, Grueneburgplatz 1, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Phone +49-69798-33731, Email christian. . emailprotected com The authors would like to thank Lamont Black, Meg Donovan, Xiaoding Liu, Raluca Roman, Sascha Steffen, Nuria Suarez, Larry D. Wall, and eccentricicipants at the 29th GdRE International Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance for useful comments. 1 Why do b ordinances fail? After every crisis, this question is asked by regulators, politicians, wedge managers, customers, investors, and academics, hoping that an answer can help improve the stability of the pecuniary system and/or prevent afterlife crises.Although a commodious body of query has been able to provide a number of answers to this question, many aspects remain unresolved. After all, the desi re misadventures during the recent monetary crisis of 2007-2010 take up shown that the gained know conductge about till defaults is apparently still not sufficient to prevent large come of patoiss from failing. Most studies of buzzword default hold up focalization on the influence of beaking variables, such as detonator balances, with some success (e. g. Martin, 1977 Pettway and Sinkey, 1980 Lane, Looney, and Wansley, 1986 Espahbodi, 1991 kale and Gunther, 1995, 1998 Helwege, 1996 Schaeck, 2008 Cole and dust coat, 2012). However, almost no question to date has by dint of empirical observation polld the influence in incorporatedd brass section characteristics, such as willpower structure or management structure, engage on a vernaculars probability of default (PD). 1 This is perhaps surprising for two reasons. The send-off is the calls for corporate formation- averaged mechanisms to control hope risk taking during and after the recent financial crisis (e. . , restrictions on compensation and perks under TARP, disclosure of compensation and advisory votes of shareholders about executive director compensation under DoddFrank, guidance for compensation such as deferred compensation, connective of compensation with performance and risk, disclosure of compensation, etc. by the G20, or much recent words in the UK regarding a lifetime ban from the financial services diligence on directors of collapsed banks), which are largely without basis in the empirical literature on bank defaults.The second is the literature showing that system mechanisms can see a very strong influence on bank performance in harm of risk taking (e. g. , Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990 Gorton and Rosen, 1995 Anderson and Fraser, 2000 Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2003 Laeven and Levine, 2009 Pathan, 2009, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). It is thus the goal of this paper to analyze the roles of corporate establishment, including both ownership structure and manage ment structure, in bank defaults. The results are key to underpinning the recent calls for changes in corporate political science to control risk.As swell up, the results whitethorn add a new dimension to the extant literature on the effects of corporate government activity 1 An exception is Berger and Bouwman (2012), which controls for institutional block ownership, bank holding beau monde membership, and foreign ownership in models of bank survival and market share. However, the paper does not steering on these variables, nor does it allow the ownership of directors and unalike types of bank engagementees, which are the key corporate face variables of interest here. 2 on bank performance.Although this body of research has clearly established the causalities between corporate government and bank risk taking, no study has so far used corporate governance structures to help explain bank defaults or to take away default from no default banks. Our paper attempts to fill thi s void. To analyze the influence of corporate governance structures on bank defaults, we analyze 249 US commercial bank defaults during the termination of 2007Q1 to 2010Q3 in comparison to a sample of 4,021 no default US commercial banks. We use five qualifys of instructive variables in multivariate logit obsession models of default.First, we include the impact of news report variables on banks probability of default (PD). These eyeshadeing variables are well represented in the established literature on bank default. Second, we employ various corporate governance indicators to measure banks ownership structure and management structure. For ownership structure, we use the shareholdings of different categories of bank management, whether the CEO is in like manner the largest shareholder, whether the bank or its holding company is publicly traded, and whether the bank is in a multibank holding company.For management structure, we use the numbers of outside directors, knob offic ers, and other corporate insiders (all normalized by board size), the board size itself, and if the Chairman of a bank is also the CEO. For the purposes of this paper, we define headland officers as all bank managers with a political boss officer position, such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Lending Officer (CLO), or Chief attempt Officer (CRO). Third, we incorporate measures of market competition.We thereby account for the large literature on bank market queen which is inconclusive on the effects of high(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) market power on bank stability, depending on whether the handed-down competition-fragility view or the competition-stability view dominates, as discussed in Section II A. We also account for the banks competitors subprime loan moving picture a factor often cited as a major source of default risk in the recent crisis which could help the bank by weakening or eliminating some of its competition.F ourth, we employ economic variables at the state level GDP emergence and the support aline inflation the latter of which is recalld to defend contributed to instability in the banking system due to banks being able to scarce partially recover collateral in defaulted owe loans. Finally, we account for potential differences among federal bank regulators. Our results confirm the extant bank misfortune literature by finding that accounting variables such as the heavy(p) ratio, the return on rack upmations, and the portion of non-performing loans, help predict bank default. Our key new finding is that the ownership structure of a bank is also an valuable predictor of bank PD. Specifically, triad bank ownership variables prove to be significant predictors of bank failure the shareholdings of outside directors (directors without other direct management executive functions deep down the bank), the shareholdings of chief officers, and the shareholdings of other corporate in siders (lower-level management, such as vice presidents). Interestingly, the effects differ among these three stems.While our results suggest that large shareholdings of outside directors and chief officers lessening a banks probability of default, larger shareholdings of lower-level management significantly increase bank PD. We find that these ownership structure variables add substantial explanatory power to the regressions, raising the adjusted R-Squared of the logit equations by more than half relative to the accounting variables alone. We offer explanations for these perhaps unexpected findings.We hypothesize that lower-level managers with large shares whitethorn take on more risk because of the moral hazard problem, whereas this problem may not apply as much to outside directors and chief officers because they are vilified in the event of a default. However, our other corporate governance indicators for management structure do not appear to significantly influence bank defa ult probabilities. mayhap surprisingly, bank market power, competitors subprime loan film, state-level house set inflation and income growth, and different primary federal regulators also take aim little or no influence on bank failure.These results are robust to different specialisedations, time periods prior(prenominal) to default, as well as a possible sample selection stoop caused by the types of banks for which corporate governance data are available. In an superfluous analysis, we develop a variable based on the singular shareholdings of outside directors, chief officers, and other corporate insiders as a single default predictor variable. This measure confirms that the ownership structure of a bank has significant predictive power for bank default, especially if ob officiated some time period prior to default.Overall, our results add substantially to the question of why banks fail, and also contribute to the aforementioned discussion of corporate governance-based me chanisms to control bank risk taking. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section I, we provide an overview of the relevant literature regarding corporate governance and bank stability. In Section II A, we describe the composition of our data set. Section II B suss outs the summary statistics on anecdotal evidence of the reasons rear bank failures during the financial crisis of 2007-2010.We describe the ownership and management structures of the banks in our sample in Section II C. 4 Section II D contains summary statistics on the accounting, competition and economic data. Section III reports our main multivariate results, and in Section IV we develop and test a single indicator of bank ownership structure to predict default. Section V concludes. I. Literature Overview Our paper builds upon and expands the existing literature in two closely connected areas of research bank defaults and the influence of corporate governance structures on bank risk taking.The lit erature on bank default mostly focuses on testing a wide variety of bank accounting variables on banks default probabilities in discriminant analyses and regressions of dependent binary default indicator variables. Examples that precede the recent financial crisis are Meyer and Pfifer (1970), Martin (1977), Whalen and Thomson (1988), Espahbodi (1991), Thomson (1991, 1992), Cole and Fenn (1995), Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998), Logan (2001), and Kolari, Glennon, Shin and Ca spueo (2002). The predominant findings are that the default probability increases for banks with low capitalization and other measures of poor performance.Following this body of research, there are all few papers to date analyzing the relevant drivers of bank default during the recent financial crisis Torna (2010), Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010), Ng and Roychowdhury (2011), Berger and Bouwman (2012), and Cole and White (2012). Torna (2010) focuses on the different roles that traditional and present-day(a) banking ac tivities, such as investment banking and private loveliness-type business, have in the financial distress or failure of banks from 2007 to 2009 in the US. The paper shows that a stronger focus on these modern-day activities significantly increase a banks PD.Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) also focus on bank failures in the US, comparing the 2007-2010 period to the 1987-1992 period. They predominantly analyze the influence of local macroeconomic factors on banks failure probability. Their study shows that banks are highly vulnerable to local economic shocks and that the majority of bank failures communicatered in regions which suffered the strongest economic downturn and the highest distress in palpable estate markets in the US. Ng and Roychowdhury (2011) also analyze bank failures in the US in the crisis period 2007-2010.They focus on how so called add-backs of loan release reserves to capital can trigger bank instability. They show that add-backs of loan loss reserves to regulator y capital increase banks likelihood of failure. Berger and Bouwman (2012) focus on the effects of bank equity capital on survival and market share during both financial crises (including 5 the recent crisis) and normal times. They find that capital helps small banks survive at all times, and is important to large and medium banks as well during banking crises.Finally, Cole and White (2012) perform a test of virtually all accounting-based variables and how these mogul add to bank PD, using logit regression models on US bank failures in 2009. Using the standard CAMEL approach, they find that banks with more capital, better asset quality, higher earnings and more liquidity are less likely to fail. Their results also show that bank PD is significantly increased by more real estate construction and development loans, commercial mortgages and multi-family mortgages.Although our paper is closely related to these studies especially to the post-crisis research and in terms of sample select ion, observation period, and methodology we strongly expand the scope of the existing analyses to include corporate governance variables and other factors and are therefore able to substantially contribute to the understanding of bank failure reasons. Our most important contribution is the analysis of precise ownership and management structure variables in the standard logit regression model of default.The distress of the banking system in the wake of the recent financial crisis has triggered a discussion about the role of corporate governance structures in the stability of financial institutions. Politicians (e. g. , the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, 2011), think tanks (e. g. in the Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation Report, February 2010), NPOs (such as in the OECD project report on Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis, 2009), and academic researchers (an overview of scholarly papers regarding corporate governance and the financial crisis is provided by e. g.Mehran, Morrisson and Shapiro, 2011) have deep not only intensely discussed, but also strongly acknowledged, the importance of corporate governance for bank stability. The discussions resulted in a number of doings from regulators addressing corporate governance in banks, such as restrictions on compensation and perks under TARP, various compensation guide contentions set forth by the G20, or clawback clauses for executive compensation in addition to guidance for deferred compensation in Dodd-Frank. Banks even started to implement voluntary clawback clauses for bonus payments (such as Lloyds TSB) in addition to these mandatory clauses.However, the finding that corporate governance has implications for bank stability was already established long in front the recent financial crisis. Several studies such as Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995), and Anderson and Fraser (2000) show that governance characteristics, such as shareholder compositi on, have substantial influence on banks 6 overall stability. Their findings support that bank managers ownership is among the most important factors in determining bank risk taking.The general finding in all studies is that higher shareholdings of officers and directors induce a higher overall bank risk taking behavior. Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) show this for the 1979-1982 period in the US, and Anderson and Fraser (2000) confirm this for the 1987-1989 period. Although Gorton and Rosen (1995) obtain the similar result for the 1984-1990 period, they additionally show that the relationship between managerial shareholdings and bank risk depends on the health of the banking system as a whole it is strongly pronounced in periods of distress and superpower reverse in times of prosperity.Pathan (2009) provides empirical evidence for the period 1997-2004 that US bank holding companies assume higher risks if they have a stronger shareholder representation on the boards. Based on t hese findings, we have strong reason to believe that corporate governance structures might also have an influence on bank default probability. In light of the recent financial crisis, some studies, such as Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Erkens, Hung and Matos (2012), analyze bank ownership structures with special regard to bank risk. Testing an international sample of large publicly traded banks, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with better governance (in terms of more shareholder-friendly board structures) performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks and had higher overall stability risk than in the lead the escalation of the crisis. Specifically, they find that banks with higher controlling shareholder ownership are riskier. This result is confirmed by Gropp and Kohler (2010).Erkens, Hung and Matos (2012) analyze the influence of board independence and institutional ownership on the stock performance of a sample of 296 financial firms (also including insurance companies) in over 30 countries over the period 2007-2008. They find that banks with more independent boards and greater institutional ownership have lower stock returns. Also testing an international sample, Laeven and Levine (2009) show that banks with a more diversified and outsidercontrolled shareholder base have an overall lower risk structure than banks with a highly concentrated hareholder base in which most of the cash-flow rights pertain to one large (inside or outside) owner. Kirkpatrick (2008) also establishes that weak corporate governance in banks 2 Another corporate governance-related body of research focuses on compensation structures in banks with special regard to risk. Among the most recent works on bank management compensation and risk taking behavior are Kirkpatrick (2009), Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), DeYoung, Peng, Yan (2010), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), and Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam (2012). leads to inadequate risk management, especially insuff icient risk monitoring through the board, a factor which contributed greatly to the bank instabilities during the crisis. 3 Although the existing body of research has clearly established a connection between governance and bank risk taking behavior, none of the studies investigates the influence certain governance characteristics might have on bank default. The risk variables most often investigated are the stock price (e. g. , Beltratti and Stulz, 2012), returns (e. g. Gropp and Kohler, 2010), lending behavior (e. g. , Gorton and Rosen, 1995), or general stability indicators, such as the Z-score (e. g. , Laeven and Levine, 2009). Standard governance proxy variables are managerial shareholdings (e. g. , Anderson and Fraser, 2000), bank insider shareholdings (Gorton and Rosen, 1995), the ownership helping of the single largest shareholder (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012), or the shareholder friendliness of the board (as developed by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson, 2009, and used b y e. g.Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Our paper offers three important contributions to the literature. We are the first paper to combine a range of these factors by investigating the influence the ownership and management structures in banks may have on their default probability. We are the first paper to differentiate between top- and lower-level shareholdings as well as between outside and inside director shareholdings. Finally, our paper is the first to analyze the influence of management structures on bank default probability. II. Data A. Sample SelectionOur main data set is a collection of more than ten different data sets merged manually on the bank level. We start with the population of US commercial banks using the FFIEC Call Report data set to collect bank balance sheet, income statement, and off-balance sheet data for each 3 As noted above, Berger and Bouwman (2012) include institutional block ownership, bank holding company membership, and foreign ownership as control varia bles in models of bank survival and market share. They do not find strong, consistent results for any of these variables. 8 bank. We exclude systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), commercial banks with at least $50 billion in radical assets (as defined by Dodd-Frank), as none of these institutions failed during the crisis, perhaps because of the TARP bailout and/or comical borrowing from the discount window. 5 These data are augmented by two additional data sets containing general economic indicators on the state level. The real estate price development is measured using the quarterly returns of the seasonally-adjusted Federal Housing Financing Agency (FHFA) house price inflation index for the state.The quarterly percentage change in state GDP is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Federal Research Economic Database (FRED). The fourth data set we use contains circumstanceed information on the annual numerate-tract- or MSA (Metropolitan Statistical A rea)-level mortgage lending in the United States. This data set is referred to as the headquarters Mortgage Disclosure Act or HMDA data set, obtained through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).This data contains the total amount and volume of mortgage loans by year and census tract/MSA, both on an absolute level as well as broken down by borrower characteristics. We classify each mortgage granted to a borrower with an income of less than 50% of the median income in the respective census tract or MSA as subprime. Although we acknowledge that borrowers falling into this income group might also be classified as prime borrowers in some cases, we believe it to be a fair assumption that mortgage borrowers of this mob can be deemed as rather high-risk borrowers, and hence we group these as subprime. We include the ratio of originated subprime mortgage loans to total originated mortgage loans in our data set calculated on census tract or MSA level. We use the subprime variable and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of local market concentration as measures of competition. The HHI is based on the FDIC Summary of Deposits data on the branch level. We use each banks share of deposits by branch in each rural county or MSA market for these calculations, and take weighted averages across markets for banks in multiple local markets using the proportions of total deposits as the weights. 4 Merged or acquired banks are enured as if the involved banks had been merged at the beginning of the observation period, by consolidating the banks balance sheets. As a robustness defend, we exclude all merged and acquired banks from our data set. Results remain unchanged. 5 We also exclude all savings institutions with a niggardness charter obtained through the Office of Thrift Supervision. This also includes all failed thrifts and thrift SIFIs (such as Washington Mutual and IndyMac).We do so for reasons of comparability and to obtain a homogenous sample of commercial bank failures only. 6 We use total deposits in calculating the HHI because it is the only variable for which bank location is available. 9 In a next step, we collect data on corporate governance, specifically, ownership and management measures. The information is taken from four sources the Mergent Bank Database, the SEC annual bank reports publicly available through the SECs EDGAR website, the FDIC Institutions data, and CRSP.The Mergent data base contains detailed ownership and management information for 495 US commercial banks (both stock-listed and private). We specifically use information on each banks shareholders, their directors, and officers as well as on the other corporate insiders. To expand the sample, we complement the Mergent data base with the information given in the annual reports filed with the SEC of each bank with registered stock. The information on whether a bank is in a multibank holding company or not is taken from the FDIC Institutions data s et, obtained through the official FDIC website.Public banks are all banks or banks in bank holding companies (BHCs) with SEC-registered shares which are publicly listed and traded on a United States stock exchange over the observation period. We serve subsidiaries of multibank holding companies as public banks if their respective BHC is publicly listed. Information on trading and listing is obtained from CRSP. Banks with (CUSIP registered-) shares which have been sold in private placements are case-hardened as privately-owned banks. All banks without a stock listing and without a stock-listed BHC are treated as private banks.In a subsist step, we have to date which banks failed within our observation period. As we only focus on US commercial bank failures in the recent financial crisis of 2007-2010, we use the FDIC Failed Institutions list as report by the FDIC. 7 This list contains a detailed description of each failure of an FDIC-insured commercial bank or thrift, including th e name of the bank, the exact date of failure (i. e. , when the bank was put into FDIC conservatorship), its location, the estimated bell of the failure to the FDIC, as well as information on the acquiring institution or liquidation of the failed bank.This list allows us to compile the data set of all failed institutions which are eligible for the analyses in our paper. To gather additional information on each failure, we use multiple sources. First, we employ the Material Loss Reports (MLRs) published by the FDIC as part of their bankruptcy procedure for all material bank failures. 8 In it, the FDIC provides a detailed report on the causes for the failure of the bank, whether or not the failure was caused by the banks management and its (lack of) 7 As obtained through the FDIC website http//www. dic. gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist. html The FDIC publishes Material Loss Reports for all bank defaults which result in a material loss to the FDIC insurance fund. On January 1st 20 10, the threshold for a material loss to the FDIC fund was raised from $25 million to $200 million. 8 10 risk management, and whether or not the failure could have been judge by the regulatory and supervisory authorities of the bank. For failed institutions for which no MLR was published, we gather news wire articles, press releases or reports from newspapers located in each banks local market.The information we take from these multiple sources is the exact failure reason, whether or not big risk management was among the causes for the failure, whether or not regulatory action had been taken against the failed bank (especially cease-and-desist orders), and whether or not the failure came as a surprise to the regulatory and supervisory authorities. We use one additional source to determine the surprise of each banks failure stability reports (LACE Reports) published by Kroll Bond Ratings, an independent firm specialized in military rating banks and other financial services firms.Th ese reports contain a rating scheme for each bank (based on a number of standard rating indicators) ranging from A (best) to F (worst). As the ratings are published quarterly, we are able to determine whether or not a bank has a rating better than F in the quarter prior to failure. We deem any failure as surprising if either the MLR specifically states that it was surprising or the LACE report shows that the failed banks rating was better than F in the quarter prior to failure.This leaves us with a data set of 249 default banks and 4,021 non-default banks. All bank failures occur in the period 2007Q1 to 2010Q3. For the regressions we obtain a total of 79,984 bankquarter observations in an unbalanced panel. As corporate governance information cannot be obtained for all banks, we exclude all failed and non-failed banks from our subsample of banks with corporate governance data for which we cannot obtain reliable information on the desired ownership and management variables.Our final s ubsample of banks with corporate governance data consists of 85 default banks and 243 no default banks, recorded over the same period, for a total of 5,905 bank-quarter observations. A detailed description of all of the explanatory variables used in the regressions is provided in Table 1. (Table 1) B. Anecdotal Evidence on Bank Defaults We first investigate the causes of bank failures on an anecdotal level. We do so to better understand the different reasons for bank failures and to ensure that our sample of bank failures is not biased by e. . too many cases of fraud or regulatory intervention. We draw on the 11 aforementioned Material Loss Reports (MLRs) and news sources to determine that the reasons for bank failures can be clustered into six distinct groups General Crisis Related, fluidness Problems Only, loanword Losses Only, joint Liquidity Problems and Loan Losses, Fraud, and Other. The MLRs and other sources reporting on the failures mentioned these six groups of failure r easons almost exclusively.If MLRs and/or news reports do not contain a specific failure reason, but instead mention that the failure came as a result of the general economic conditions or the crisis, we label the failure as General Crisis Related. As shown in Table 2, panel A, we find that 95 out of 249 banks fall into this category. If it is explicitly mentioned that either only liquidity problems, or only loan losses, or a combination of both was the cause for the failure, we cluster the banks in the respective groups Liquidity Problems Only, Loan Losses Only, or Liquidity Problems and Loan Losses. We find that only one bank was put into FDIC conservatorship as the result of liquidity problems only. In contrast, 106 banks failures were triggered by loan losses only and 22 banks defaulted after the joint occurrence of both liquidity problems and loan losses. Finally, we find that 5 banks failed or were taken into FDIC conservatorship due to management fraud. For 20 banks, a speci fic failure reason could not be determined we thus label their failure reason as Other. These anecdotal results show that loaninduced losses played a dominant role for banks stability during the recent financial crisis, as opposed to liquidity problems. The FDIC also publishes the estimated cost of the failure to the FDIC insurance fund. We collect and report these numbers to show the economic importance and which failure types are the most costly. The overall estimated cost of all failures in our sample to the FDIC insurance fund amount to around $6. 75 billion. In 2009 the fund incurred the highest cost with an estimate of $2. 6 billion from 119 failures however, the highest insurance costs per institution were incurred in 2008, with only 20 failures resulting in an estimated cost of $2. 61 billion. The 106 loan lossinduced failures are the most costly group with a total of $2. 08 billion. Interestingly, defaults due to both loan and liquidity losses seem to be much more expensiv e per institution as compared with loan loss-only failures. Although the overall contribution of the insurance cost to the overall estimated FDIC losses of the loan and liquidity loss group is only approximately littler with $2. 3 billion, this group consists of only 22 banks, as compared to the 106 bank failures in the loan loss-only group. (Table 2) 12 In a second step, we collect anecdotal evidence on the role of the banks management and the regulatory agencies prior to bank failure. Specifically, we determine whether or not bad risk management contributed to the default. Whenever the MLRs, other official FDIC releases, or newspaper articles mention that the bank suffered from managers bad risk management, we classify the respective bank as a big(p) Risk Management bank prior to default.Panel B in Table 2 shows that this is the case for only 18% of all defaults. The fact that not even a fifth of all bank defaults during the recent financial crisis happened due to inadequate ris k control systems (or failures thereof) calls for a detailed investigation of alternative reasons for bank failures, such as the banks ownership and management structures. We also gather information on the actions taken by the regulatory and supervisory agencies prior to the default. Supervisory actions prior to default (especially cease-and-desist orders to prevent the bank from failing) are used in only 7. % of all defaults. Based on the MLRs and the LACE ratings, we also find that only 13. 6% of all bank failures came as a surprise and were neither anticipated by a rating agency nor by the supervisory authority. According to Panel B in Table 2, one explanation for this rather low percentage of surprises might be that most of the surprising failures occurred at the onset of the financial crisis, when market participants have not been able to predict the severity of the crisis, while in 2009 and 2010 more banks failed but this was expected more often.Taken together, Panel B in Tabl e 2 shows that our sample of bank failures does not put too much weight on potentially distorting factors as for example regulatory intervention or fraud and emphasizes the requirement of an investigation of alternative reasons for bank failures, such as the banks ownership and management structures. C. Corporate Governance and Bank Defaults Table 3 shows summary statistics of the ownership and management data of our sample banks.We report summary statistics for the total sample, as well as broken down by default and no default banks, bad risk management, banks subject to cease-and-desist orders prior to default, and surprising versus non-surprising failures. We define Outside Directors as members of a banks board of directors, who do not perform any function other than being a board director in the respective bank. The literature on corporate governance also refers to this group as independent directors. As noted above, we define Chief Officers as all bank managers with a chief 13 officer position. Other Corporate Insiders are all bank employees holding lower-level management positions in a bank, such as vice presidents, treasurers, or department heads. dividing line that these Other Corporate Insiders are neither Chief Officers nor members of the banks board of directors. The shareholdings are determined based on the Mergent data base or SEC filings. The data contain name, title, and the amount of shares held by each manager.The shareholding variables are normalized by the number of the banks outstanding shares and the numbers of outside directors, chief officers and other employees are scaled by the board size. 9 Table 3 reports that, on average, default banks have much lower shareholdings of outside directors, approximately lower shareholdings of chief officers, and much higher shareholdings of other corporate insiders, as compared to no default banks. Additionally, the CEO is the single largest shareholder in some of the default banks. This is never the case in no default banks.In terms of management structures, we find that default banks have smaller boards, few outside directors and more chief officers relative to their board size, and the Chairman is less often also the CEO than in no default banks. (Table 3) These values paint an interesting picture of the ownership and management characteristics of default and no default banks in our sample. Table 3 provides empirical evidence that default banks tend to be characterized by fewer shareholdings of outside directors and chief officers and larger shareholdings of lower level management.A tentative conclusion of these descriptive results could be that the incentives are set very differently in default and no default banks. In no default banks, more than 80% of all shares are held by chief officers, who are responsible for the continuation of banks operations in the long term, or by outside directors, who are responsible for the oversight of these operations. Furthermore, outside directors and chief officers are publicly known figureheads of the banks. This might imply that their personal reputation is connected to the banks performance and survival, at least to some extent.In contrast, lower-level management, such as vice-presidents or treasurers, hold more than 50% of all shares in default banks. This group is neither publicly known nor held responsible in public for the failure of the bank, even though they may exert a tremendous amount of direct influence on the actual risk 9 Note that the scaling with the board size does not imply that the sum of the three variables adds up to one because other corporate insiders are not members of the board while also chief officers are not always members of the board. 14 taking of the bank in its daily operations. 0 The position of lower level management is equivalent to equity holders in the unequivocal Merton (1977) firm value model which states that shareholders of insured banks have a moral hazard incentive to in crease variance of returns, since the assets of the bank can be put to the FDIC in the event of default. This incentive may be less for the outside directors and chief officers who are publicly known and vilified in the event of default as compared to opaque lower level management. Accordingly, Table 3 suggests that outside directors and chief officers behave more responsibly in terms of risk taking when they have large stakes in the bank.In contrast, other non-executive corporate insiders tend to increase risk taking when they hold shares of the bank. We investigate this result in more detail in the next section in a multivariate setting. Looking at the ownership structures of default banks with bad risk management, we find that they have fewer outside director shareholdings, fewer other corporate insider shareholdings and larger chief officer shareholdings as compared to banks where bad risk management is not mentioned.These exact same shareholder structures are featured by defaul t banks against which cease-anddesist orders had been publishd in comparison to banks without such orders out front failure. Regarding the management structures of banks with bad risk management prior to default, we find that they are characterized by smaller board sizes, fewer chief officers and fewer outside directors relative to their size.Again, the exact same characteristics can be seen in banks against which cease-and-desist orders had been issued before default, except for the board size, which is slightly higher in banks with cease-and-desist order. These numbers allow for two tentative interpretations regarding the existence of bad risk management first, banks run by managers facing little oversight through fellow corporate insiders or outside shareholders are more likely to be able to exercise bad risk management, causing the bank to fail.Second, the regulators might be aware of the bad risk management situation in these banks, but act to no avail, i. e. issue ceaseand-d esist orders against the banks without being able to save them from defaulting. Interestingly, the ownership and management characteristics of bad risk management and ceaseand-desist-banks are also mostly shared by banks whose failure came as a surprise to markets and regulators. As compared to banks whose failures were more predictable, they have fewer outside 10We acknowledge that there are a few exceptions, such as nick Leeson, Jerome Kerviel, and Bruno Iksil, who became known to the public. However, individual traders have to severely cripple their financial institutions (with losses, only attributable to them, in the billions) before being in the news. Additionally, all of these now infamous cases were based on fraudulent risk taking, as opposed to risk taking within the allowed boundaries. The news on these tail events also supports the notion that lower-level employees may have a tremendous impact on bank risk. 5 directors and other corporate insiders as shareholders. In te rms of management, they have slightly smaller boards, more chief officers and outside directors relative to their board size. Only the number of shares held by chief officers is lower for surprising failure banks, a characteristic in which they differ from the bad risk management and cease-and-desist order banks. These governance features can be a sign of limited outside control of the banks executive management.As a result, executive managers might have been able to hide the true financial situation of the bank from regulators (in spite of a possibly higher scrutiny expressed by the cease-and-desist orders) and other stakeholders until the very end, either in an attempt to rescue the bank or for mere fear of admitting the failure of the bank. These structures might also allow for gambling for resurrection in an attempt to save the bank. Without outside control, the managers could have taken on excessive risks with promising high returns in a last effort to rescue the bank.We finall y report information if the bank is publicly traded versus privately owned and if it is organized in a multibank holding company as this also describes a banks ownership structure. We also include these factors because publicly traded banks and banks in multibank holding companies might have access to additional capital markets besides only the banks internal funds (or the internal funds of the holding company) which, especially in times of distress, might serve as a source of financial strength.About 27% of all default and 41% of all no default banks in our sample were publicly traded over the observation period. Only 12% of the default banks and 14% of the no default banks were part of a multibank holding structure. We find similar numbers for the risk management, cease-and-desist order and non-surprising failure groups. Table 3 indicates that certain corporate governance characteristics, such as limited outside control of management through fellow top-level employees or through i ndependent outside directors as hareholders, can foster bad risk management and the concealment of a banks true financial situation. If managers are inadequately monitored, they lack incentives to act in the best interest of shareholders. The fact that a small number of banks failed surprisingly might be an attribute that it can be difficult for the regulator to recognize or anticipate problems if the managers are willing and able to conceal them. Our results are therefore in line with the findings of Anderson and Fraser (2000), who show that management shareholdings and risk taking are positively related.The results are also consistent with e. g. Laeven and Levine (2009), who show that banks with more concentrated ownership and management structures also exhibit higher overall risk 16 taking. We therefore substantially extend this body of literature by showing that the management shareholdings also have implications for the most extreme case of bank risk, which is default. D. Summ ary Statistics of Accounting, Competition and Economic Variables Table 4 provides summary statistics on the variables other than the corporate governance variables.It shows that default banks differ strongly from no default banks, especially in terms of general characteristics, business focus, and overall stability. As can be seen in the table, default banks are on average larger than no default banks as measured by asset size, have a lower capital ratio, lower loan volume relative to their assets, stronger loan growth as well as weaker loan diversification as measured by the loan-concentration HHI. On the supporting side, default banks rely more on brokered deposits and less on retail deposits than no default banks.Not surprising, default banks also perform worse in terms of overall stability than no default banks they have a negative return on assets and a much higher non-performing loan ratio. Interestingly, default banks have a lower exposure to mortgage-backed securities (MBS) than no default banks. Note that default banks do not have any off-balance sheet derivative exposure (not shown in the table), which is why we exclude this factor in our regression analyses. (Table 4) Table 4 also shows the differences in accounting data between default and no default banks for our sample with available corporate governance data.While most differences and values are very comparable between our full data sample and our corporate governance sample, one difference is asset size. The banks for which we are able to obtain ownership and management data are larger than the average banks in the full sample. However, this is to be expected, as mostly large banks register shares with the SEC, which in turn requires them to publish ownership and management data. We will therefore also test our results with respect to a possible sample selection bias in our following analyses with a specific focus on bank size and publicly traded shares.Finally, in the last three columns, the table shows the development of accounting variables from two years prior to default until the quarter immediately preceding the default. In line with expectations, we observe on average a very strong decline of the capital ratio, the return on assets, and the loan growth, paired with a strong increase in the ratio of non-performing loans 17 over the last two years before default. This confirms a rapid decline in bank profitability and a deterioration of stability.Interestingly, banks seems to strongly increase the amount of retail backup in the form of brokered deposits, from roughly 9% two years before default up to 18% in the quarter before default. At the bottom of Table 4, we show summary statistics for the market competition and state economic condition variables. For market competition, we report the deposit-based HHI of market concentration and the subprime lending ratio of originated subprime mortgage loans to total originated mortgage loans on census tract or MSA level.The state economic condition variables include the house price inflation indicator, calculated using the average quarterly returns of the seasonally-adjusted Federal Housing Financing Agency (FHFA) house price inflation index for the banks states, and the quarterly percentage changes in state GDP. 11 Comparing the values for default and no default banks, we find that default banks face slightly higher market concentration, competitors with lower subprime exposure, a steeper decrease in house price values and a slightly lower GDP growth than no default banks.These differences are confirmed for our subsample of banks for which corporate governance data is available, with the exception of market concentration, which is slightly lower for default banks than for no default banks. We do not detect any substantial change in the market competition variables over the twoyear period leading up to defaults. Market concentration only increases marginally, subprime risk remains virtually unchanged. We see slightly stronger variations in the two state economic indicators.The FHFA house price index stays negative throughout the period, decreasing slightly in the year before the default but moving to a slightly higher value in the quarter before default. The same goes for the GDP growth, which turns negative in the year before default, but moves back up to slightly positive values in the quarter before default. We will forego a detailed analysis of these univariate statistics and instead rely on the multivariate regression results to interpret the variables influence on bank defaults in greater detail. 11 We use the state economic variables from the states in which the banks have deposits.For banks with branches in different states, we calculate the weighted exposure to each state through the FDIC Summary of Deposits data, as previously used for the HHI calculation, to obtain a weighted exposure to the state economic variables. 18 III. Multivariate Analysis A. Methodology In thi s section, we investigate the possible influence factors have on bank failure in a multivariate logistic regression framework with an indicator variable for bank failure in the default quarter as dependent variable and a number of predictor variables.By choosing this model condition, we follow a broad body of literature having established this approach as standard procedure (e. g. , Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008), which was pioneered for banks by Martin (1977). We include a total of five sets of explanatory variables accounting variables, corporate governance variables, market competition measures, state economic indicators, and bank regulator variables. We combine these sets of variables to test eleven different model specifications, in which each specification is comprised of either a different set of variables or a different subsample.As reported in Table 4, we have a main sample of 249 bank defaults and 4,021 no default banks. We also have a subsample comprised of 85 d efault banks and 243 no default banks for which we obtain corporate governance data of a banks ownership and management structures. The different model specifications alternate between these two data samples. We include both subsamples in our analyses to show that our data does not suffer from selection biases i. e. , that similar results hold for banks with and without available corporate governance data.We test the contribution the different variable sets or combinations thereof have on the explanatory power of our model of bank default. We additionally test each model for three different time periods the quarter immediately preceding the default, as well as one and two years prior to default. By also testing the time component, we follow a body of research (e. g. , Cole and Gunther, 1998 Cole and White, 2012) which shows that the predictive power of binary regression models in the context of bank defaults varies over time.Table 5 contains eleven models together with an additiona l model in which we account for a possible sample selection bias. Models I and II test only the influence of accounting variables on bank defaults, separately for all banks (Model I) and the subsample of banks with available corporate governance data (Model II). These models most closely resemble the extant empirical literature on bank defaults. Models III and IV focus on the corporate governance sample only. They incorporate accounting variables in addition to six corporate governance ownership variables (Model III) and five corporate governance management variables (Model IV).Model V subsequently investigates the joint influence of the accounting and all the corporate governance variables on bank default. Models VI-VIII expand 19 this setting by adding market competition variables, the banks local market power and its competitors subprime loan exposure (Model VI), by adding economic indicators for the state house price inflation and the quarterly change in state GDP (Model VII), a nd by adding possible effects stemming from different primary federal bank regulators (Model VIII), respectively.Models IX and X conjointly incorporate these three variable sets together with accounting data and exclude corporate governance variables. Model IX does so for all banks, and Model X includes only the sample of banks with available corporate governance data. In Model XI, we include all variables. The final model, labeled Heckman Selection Model, presents a robustness check using a Heckman Selection model which will be explained later in more detail.In running these tests, we are primarily interested in three questions First, how do the different sets of variables and combinations thereof contribute to the overall explanatory power of the regression? Second, which variables are statistically significant in explaining bank failures? Finally, at what transfer in time prior to the actual default date do sets of variables or individual variables have the largest explanatory p ower in predicting bank defaults?The accounting variables include measures of the banks size, return on assets, capitalization, loan portfolio composition, funding structure, securities business, and off-balance sheet activities. By doing so, we follow a large number of articles on bank default (e. g. Lane, Looney, and Wansley, 1986 Whalen and Thomson, 1988 Espahbodi, 1991 Logan, 1991 Thomson, 1991 Cole and Gunther, 1995, 1998 Kolari et al. , 2002 Schaeck, 2008 Cole and White, 2012) who show that accounting variables have significant explanatory power in predicting bank default.By including the log of total assets, the ratio of equity to assets, and the return on assets, we follow Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998), Molina (2002) and others who show that these variables can serve as valid indicators for size, capitalization, and profitability. To measure the composition and stability of the banks loan portfolio, we include five accounting variables. We use the ratio of total loans to to tal assets, excluding construction and development (C&D) loans, as well as the ratio of C&D loans only to total assets.In doing so, we follow Cole and White (2012), who show that C&D loans have strong explanatory power in predicting bank defaults, especially in the recent financial crisis. We account for this finding by investigating the singular influence of C&D loans in a banks overall loan portfolio on the likelihood of bank failure, as well as incorporating the ratio of the banks remaining loans to its assets. We also include a loan concentration index, the growth of a banks loan portfolio and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans in the 20 regressions to account for concentration and credit risk.Short-term funding and illiquidity risks are measured by the ratios of short-term deposits to assets and brokered deposits to assets, respectively. We additionally include the ratio of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to assets. Finally, the ratio of unused commitments to ass ets is included as a measure for off-balance sheet risks. We do not include the off-balance sheet derivative exposure of the banks in our analyses as no default bank in our data sample has any exposure to these in any time period. The corporate governance variables are taken from the set of measures introduced above.To account for the banks ownership structure, we include the number of shares held by outside directors, chief officers, and other corporate insider shareholders (defined as in section II. C). Each of these variables is standardized by the number of shares outstanding of the respective bank. We also include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the banks CEO is also its single largest shareholder. In addition, we include dummy variables for whether a bank is organized in a multibank holding company, and whether the bank or its BHC is publicly traded.As mentioned before, publicly traded banks and banks in multibank holding companies might have access to further capit al markets which might serve as an additional sources of financial strength. 12 By including these ownership variables in our multivariate regression framework, we account for the previous literature on the relationship between banks ownership structures and bank stability, such as Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995), Anderson and Fraser (2000), Caprio, Laeven and Levine (2003), Laeven and Levine (2009), and Pathan (2009).We thereby moreover investigate if the stark differences in the descriptive statistics between default and no default banks in terms of ownership structure also hold in a multivariate setting. To further proxy for the banks management structure, we include the number of outside directors, the number of chief officers, the number of other corporate insiders, all scaled by the banks board size, to account for relative differences in management and oversight among banks. 3 We additionally employ (the logarithm of) the number of members of the board of directors (Board Size) and an indicator variable if the CEO of the bank is also its Chairman. We are thereby the first to explicitly investigate the impact of a banks management structure on bank default. 12 As a robustness check, we replace the multibank holding company (BHC) dummy with a dummy variable indicating whether or not the bank is part of any BHC structure, either single-bank or multibank. The results remain unchanged. 13As a robustness test, we also standardize the number of outside directors, chief officers, and other corporate insiders variables by the asset size of the bank. The results remain unchanged. 21 The set of variables on bank competition contains the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of bank market power on MSA or rural county level, its square up value, as well as the ratio of originated subprime mortgage loans to total mortgage loans originated on census tract/MSA level. We use the HHI as a proxy for the competition a bank faces in its local marke t.To calculate the HHI, we define the deposits held by each banks branches as the product market, the rural county level or MSA in which the banks branches are located as the local market, and each quarter as the temporal market. Using the standard HHI calculation method, we sum up each banks squared market share in each market and quarter. For banks which are active in multiple markets, we use the weighted average across each market to determine the HHI. A broad body of research has shown that competition is an important stability factor for banks.According to the literature, higher market power may result in either a higher or a lower probability of bank failure. In the traditional competition-fragility view, higher market power increases profit margins and results in greater franchise value with banks reducing risk taking to protect this value (e. g. , Marcus, 1984 Keeley, 1990 Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan, 1996 Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000 Carletti and Hartmann, 200 3 Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina, 2007). Thus, a higher HHI may result in a lower probability of failure.In contrast, in the competition-stability view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk and a higher probability of failure as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers acquit it harder to repay loans and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems (e. g. , Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005 Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal, 2006 De Nicolo and Loukoianova, 2007 Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe, 2009). Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) furthermore argue that this effect may be nonmonotonic.We control for this possibility by also incorporating the squared value of local market power. Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) argue that the effects of both views may be in place banks with more market power may have riskier loan portfolios but less overall risk due to higher capital ratios or other risk-mitigating techniques and find empirical evidence of these predictions. In addition to the HHI, we also include in our analyses the ratio of originated subprime mortgage loans to total mortgage loans originated to account for the particularities of the recent financial crisis.As is known now, the excessive origination of mortgages to borrowers with subprime creditworthiness led to high losses for banks in the recent financial crisis. Additionally, prior research establishes that real estate loans in general also played an important role for bank stability in earlier crises (e. g. , Cole and Fenn, 1995). We include the average subprime mortgage loan ratio in a banks census tract to measure the subprime risk exposure of 22 the banks local competitors.Based on the aforementioned literature and the characteristics of the recent financial crisis, we hypothesize that stronger subprime exposure of a banks competitors could increase the competitors risk structures and therefore also their default risk, which might have helped the observed banks su rvive the crisis by weakening their competitors. The set of v